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THE PRIYAYI*
Heather Sutherland
This essay is a discussion of some assumptions and as yet unan­
swered questions which surround the term priyayi, one of the most 
commonly used categories in Javanese studies. The term priyayi, refer­
ring to Java*s governing upper class, has been used for a long time 
both by the Javanese themselves and by Dutch scholars, but it has 
attained a high degree of currency among English speaking students of 
Indonesia since Clifford Geertz published The Religion of Java in I960.* 1 
Even though Geertz*s study has sometimes been criticized, the trichot­
omy of ideal types he presents has been widely accepted as a standard 
organizing principle, a boon for many students struggling to impose 
patterns on intractable realities.
Koentjaraningrat has pointed out that Geertz*s santri-abangan- 
priyayi taxonomy confused a legitimate division between two religious 
traditions (syncretist abangan, Muslim santri) by treating priyayi as 
a comparable category, when essentially it refers to a social class.
In actuality, priyayi could follow either abangan or santri religio- 
cultural traditions.2 Koentjaraningratfs criticism seems completely 
valid, and this essay is not intended as a further examination of the 
Geertzian trichotomy. Rather, it is an attempt to place the priyayi 
more firmly in context, by showing how their cultural, political and 
social roles were shaped by their essential function of mediator, con­
necting centers and regions, elites and common people.3
There is considerable consistency in the image of the priyayi pre­
sented in Javanese court literature and hence also in most academic 
accounts. Originally the term was para yayi, meaning f!younger brothers"
* Part of this essay is based upon material from my Yale University (1973) doctoral 
dissertation: "Pangreh Pradja. Java!s Indigenous Administrative Corps and Its
Role in the Last Decades of Dutch Colonial Rule." The ideas expressed here grew 
out of the research for this thesis and for the two-part article, "Notes on 
Java!s Regent Families,” Indonesia, No. 16 (October 1973), pp. 113-49; No. 17 
(April 1974), pp. 1-42. I am grateful to Dr. M. C. Ricklefs and Mr. C. W. Watson 
for their comments on earlier drafts of this article; neither of course bear any 
responsibility for its content.
1. Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960); Harsja W. 
Bachtiar, "The Religion of Java: A Commentary,11 Madjalah Ilmu-Ilmu Sastra Indo­
nesia, V, No. 1 (1973), pp. 85-118.
2. See Koentjaraningrat!s review of The Religion of Java in Madjalah llmu-Ilmu 
Sastra, I, No. 2 (1963), pp. 188-91. See also Robert B. Cruikshank, "Abangan 
Santri and Priyayi: A Critique," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, III, No. 1 
(1972), pp. 39-43.
3. For a valuable account of a santri broker, and a discussion of the "broker" func­
tion, see Clifford Geertz, "The Javanese Kijahi: The Changing Role of a Cultural 
Broker," Comparative Studies in Society and History, II (1960), pp. 228-49.
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(of the king), and by extension it came to include the governing aris­
tocracy.4 Nobles and officials, court-based administrators and local 
chiefs could all be classed as priyayi. Ideally speaking, a priyayi 
was a well-born Javanese holding high government office, thoroughly 
versed in the aristocratic culture of the courts. He should be famil­
iar with classical literature, music and dance, the wayang kulit 
(puppet shadow play), and with the subtleties of philosophy, ethics and 
mysticism. He should have mastered the nuances of polite behavior, 
language and dress and, until well into the late nineteenth century, he 
was expected to be at home in the arts of war, skilled in the handling 
of horse and weapons.
In addition to these acquired skills the priyayi was meant to be a 
man of integrity and honor, imbued with a deep awareness of the moral 
demands of his position, and of his obligations to the rulers, the 
people and the high ethical code of the elite. In short, the image of 
the priyayi was of a man able to meet the spiritual and ceremonial as 
well as technical demands of office. The extent to which this image 
reflects reality depends upon several factors, most importantly, the 
degree to which the courts themselves followed a standard pattern, and 
how far the courts imposed their norms upon the regional elites under 
their sway.
The relatively high degree of consensus concerning the priyayi 
model reflects a tendency of both scholars and, to a lesser extent, the 
Javanese elite itself, to accept the individual court of Mataram and 
its values as a proper standard and example. Mataram, a south central 
Javanese state which reached its peak in the seventeenth century, was 
one of the two major powers encountered by the Dutch East India Company 
or VOC when it first arrived in Java. The other was the mercantile, 
Islamic maritime state of Banten, but this declined during the seven­
teenth century and was abolished as a sultanate in the early 1800s; its 
impact on Dutch and later conceptions of indigenous polities was not 
comparable to that of Mataram. Far less is known about the structure 
and attitudes of the Bantenese court than of Mataram and the latter has 
remained Javafs best known native state, either in its original united 
form or through its heirs, the four courts of Surakarta, Yogyakarta, 
Mangkunegaran and Pakualaman. Moreover, since during its expansionist 
career Mataram had succeeded in conquering most of Java, at least tem­
porarily, her influence was widespread, particularly among the upper 
classes, those most exposed to both political and cultural penetration.
The predominance of the Mataramese model in accounts of the Java­
nese state is perhaps inevitable, as the highly developed culture of 
the court and its political importance to the Dutch ensured extensive 
documentation in both indigenous and European sources. But this model 
is closely tied to a particular political and cultural perspective and 
reflects the interests and values of the capital’s upper classes. We 
are informed only of matters which were important to that elite, and 
the information and interpretation is heavily biased. This kraton 
(court) centered approach cannot be automatically accepted as represent­
ing the viewpoint of provincial and local authorities and, moreover, 
cultural differentiation in Java is such that some discussion of re­
gional variation is essential if we are to assess the validity of the 
model. Therefore discussion in the following pages will tend to focus
4. L. W. C. van den Berg, De Inlandsche Rangen en Titels op Java en Madoera (Batavia 
Landsdrukkerij, 1887), p. 44.
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upon provincial elites--a major source of the modern priyayi--and upon 
the effects of regionalism.
It is possible to divide Java into a number of regions each made 
up of areas linked together by centuries of interaction which focused 
upon a court or a linked network of political capitals, and usually 
shared somed some sense of cultural identity. The boundaries of such 
areas were fluid; each comprised a number of subregions, which in turn 
consisted of a mosaic of local communities; hence the selection of a 
particular level of regionalism as a framework for discussion depends 
upon the individual research topic. Despite the paucity of material, 
it is possible to sketch in, rather tentatively, a regional pattern 
which prqvides a better context for discussion of the priyayi than does 
an unjustified assumption of the overall applicability of a uniform 
Mataram-style milieu.
The most obvious division in Java is between three major cultural 
linguistic groups: the Sundanese speakers of Priangan, West Java; the
Madurese of Madura island and much of northeast Java; and the Javanese 
proper. But even on this level frontiers are difficult to define, 
given the linguistic mixture in areas like Banten and Cirebon, and also 
the existence of subdivisions. The Javanese, for example, distinguish 
between the heartland Mataram area, often referred to as kejaw&n, and 
beyond this, but also Javanese speaking, the north Java littoral or 
pasisir, and the areas of the east, bang wetan and ujung timur.5 These 
can be broken down still further: the pasisir, for example, includes a
number of recognizable entities, sometimes just a port town and its 
hinterland, often a continuation of a pre-colonial "city state," or 
sometimes a larger more separate region which was formerly a consider­
able power, such as Surabaya. Moreover, despite considerable Javanese 
speaking populations, Banten and Cirebon, once independent sultanates, 
had their own distinct identities; the former in particular lay outside 
the frontiers of the main Javanese world.
Each of these levels was recognized as an historical unit, and re­
flects the richness of regional differentiation in Java. But the pri­
mary framework for most priyayi was probably even more restricted, their 
vision not extending much beyond their own small towns and the linked 
network of surrounding villages. In Dutch times many such complexes 
were given formal identity as regencies or kabupatZn, which were re­
garded as the most "traditional" of the supra-village administrative 
categories.
The priyayi must be placed against this diverse background, for in 
reality the setting modified major dimensions of priyayi identity. The 
remainder of this essay examines three aspects of the priyayi: as cul­
tural type, as a group with a particular political function, and as a 
social class. In general attention is focused upon the importance of 
regional variation and the effects of the priyayi's "broker" functions.
The Priyayi as Cultural Type
Priyayi culture was subject to considerable variation, reflecting 
the interplay of local traditions with responses to such outside stimuli
5. Bang w§tan, the east, seems to refer more to the Surabaya region, while ujung
timur, eastern end, is the very easternmost end of the island, the Dutch Oosthoek. 
I am grateful to Dr. Ricklefs for clarifying this distinction.
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as Islamization and European influence. The relative strength of these 
strands was shaped by the intensity of contact with cultural raetropoles, 
depending on geographic location, position within the social-political 
hierarchy and overall openness to innovation. Some priyayi were in 
intimate communication with the courts and ports from which change 
spread. Others remained in their isolated towns, indifferent to new 
fashions or remote power struggles. Only the officials of the larger 
towns could be described as urban, and even so, their outlook may have 
been less cosmopolitan or worldly than the term might suggest. Al­
though priyayi culture has been described as "the outcome of nearly 
sixteen centuries of urban living,"6 many priyayi were probably more 
at home in their dusty market towns or small harbor settlements than 
in the glittering world of the central courts.
It has been remarked that "classical Javanese culture," the milieu 
par excellence of the priyayi, was basically a creation of the nine­
teenth century, as it was only then that the court culture of Surakarta 
and Yogyakarta became recognized as the genuine Javanese civilization.7 
Since these two "self-governing" (indirectly ruled) states were created 
by the mid-eighteenth century division of Mataram they can, despite the 
often emphasized differences between them, be regarded as continuations 
of the preceding court. So their eventual cultural dominance must be 
linked to earlier processes, the extension of Mataramese influence, as 
well as to their position under colonial rule, when as nominally semi­
independent states, they tended to be regarded as guardians of tradi­
tion. During Mataram's period of political expansion her cultural 
influence also spread further and deeper in the subjugated or vassal 
regions. There was, for example, limited "Javanization" in Sunda and 
Madura, with kejaw^n language, styles and ideas being very influential. 
The local aristocraties were the chief disseminators of this central 
culture, although the Mataramese practice of establishing strategic 
plantations of Javanese settlers also contributed, particularly at the 
popular level. Nonetheless, these regions retained their own languages 
and literatures, including both local material and adaptations of bor­
rowed forms, and their own special traits.8
Javanization reinforced kejawSn influence on local elites in the 
outer parts of the island: this much seems obvious, but no real as­
sessment of the cultural implications of this process is yet possible, 
as so little is known of regional history during this period. Since 
Islamic influence was being extended and consolidated at the same time, 
it might seem tempting to view the era as one of competition between 
two aggressive cultural traditions: those of "Indianized" Mataram and
"Muslim" pasisir. But this is too simplistic a dichotomy, as kejawdn 
cultural traits were shared by the northern port cities, while there 
were major centers of Islamic learning in Mataram. There was competi­
6. Geertz, Religion, p. 231. M. C. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi 
1749-1792. A History of the Division of Java (London: Oxford University Press, 
1974), p. 419 note 2, queries this figure of "sixteen centuries."
7. Th. G. Th. Pigeaud, Literature of Java (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1967), I, p. 8. Un­
fortunately there is no discussion of the evidence lying behind this intriguing 
remark.
8. D. H. Burger, Structural Changes in Javanese Society: The Supra-Village Sphere 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modem Indonesia Project, 1956), pp. 14-16. There is a 
wealth of material on Javanese local culture in Th. G. Th. Pigeaud, Javaanse 
Volksvertoningen (Batavia: Volkslectuur, 1938).
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tion and sometimes hostility between original Javanese and Islamic 
values, but the situation was so complex and is so little understood 
that any attempt to describe the resulting cultural pattern would be 
meaningless. It seems certain, however, that the impact of these in­
fluences upon local societies did not produce a standardized culture, 
but resulted in the development of a number of variant traditions. 
Different regions retained their own characters, and these distinct 
identities also shaped the priyayi culture of the area. It could be 
expected, for" example, that the priyayi of Cirebon show some differ­
ences from those of Central Java, not only in their favorite art forms, 
in language and music but also in their underlying patterns of values 
and beliefs.
Any'attempt at a detailed discussion of the self-perceptions of 
Java’s governing elites would require lengthy and sophisticated re­
search in a number of fields, ranging from linguistics and comparative 
literature to psychology and anthropology; it would also require inor­
dinate self-confidence, particularly for a non-Javanese scholar. How­
ever, on a generalized level it is possible to give a tentative and 
impressionistic description of regional cultural identities. The par­
ticular character of the main regions is best revealed by focusing on 
those periods in their several histories which have come to be regarded 
either as the formative era in which regional identity was established, 
or as the "Golden Age" in which their specific qualities were most 
highly developed or displayed to best advantage.
Such "Golden Ages" may never have existed in reality, and probably 
bear little resemblance to actual events or circumstances in the period 
in question. They may simply be retrospective glorifications of the 
past, and relatively recent creations. Nevertheless, they can be re­
vealing of a people’s values and attitudes. This crystallization of 
identity in some semi-mythic past was particularly important for the 
local priyayi, as they conceived of themselves as guardians of tradi­
tion and heirs to long-dead heroes. In many cases, priyayi genealogies 
document this link to the "Golden Age," and constitute an important 
element in the elite’s legitimation of its rule. But for all local 
people, legends and stories of past glory played a major part in shap­
ing their conception of the politico-cultural framework of their lives.
For the north coast of Java, from Banten to Pasuruan, the defini­
tive era was that of the wali sanga (nine saints), the time when Islam 
was brought to Java and the first Muslim states achieved renown. Dur­
ing this period--the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries--so the legends 
go, wandering holy men founded towns, built mosques, composed chroni­
cles and won wars. These wali were usually remembered under the name 
of the place with which they were most intimately associated, the site 
of their school or grave, prefixed by the honorific Sunan. They were 
apt symbols of the pasisir, as their parochial identification combined 
with the all embracing sweep of Islam paralleled the coast cities’ 
ability to reconcile a proud independence with a sporadic recognition 
of common interests, competition with cooperation.
The political elites of the pasisir region were in most cases con­
nected by descent to the wali and, often, to each other--at least 
according to traditions. The sultans of both Banten and Cirebon were 
descended from Sunan Gunung Jati, and most of the Banten aristocracy 
traced themselves from these sultans, from Sunan Gunung Jati’s grand­
daughter Ratu Pembayon or from two Bantenese followers of his son Hasa- 
nuddin. Both Sunan Kalijaga and Sunan Giri established small "prince­
doms," rooted in spiritual authority but encompassing political power
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as well. Until 1883 the group of settlements clustered around the head 
village of Kadilangu (or Adilangu), in Demak, was under the administra­
tive and financial control of Sunan Kalijaga's descendants, who were 
usually known as Pangeran Wijil. Giri remained the seat of the "priest- 
kings" until the late seventeenth century when the last, together with 
most of his family, was killed by the ruler of Mataram.9
Similarly, .many coastal regents or bupati (the highest native ad­
ministrative official under the Dutch) claimed descent from the wali 
sanga or the royal houses which sprang from them. The old regent fami­
lies of Kudus and Tuban traced themselves back to Sunan Kudus and Sunan 
Kalinyamat respectively, while the bupati of Kendal located their ori­
gins on thq one hand with Sunan Ngampel and Sunan Kalinyamat, and on 
the other with the sultans of Demak. This sultanate was also the 
source of the regent dynasties of Tegal and Semarang.10 According to 
one Dutch authority, early seventeenth-century Surabaya, Gresik, Tuban, 
Pati and Demak were virtually independent kingdoms ruled by descendants 
of the wall.11
Although the wali were bearers of Islam to Java, they were also 
closely linked to the mainstream of indigenous culture. The pasisir 
was not orthodox in its Islam, as it fused existing traditions with 
Muslim belief, but nevertheless it seems probable that the coastal 
elites tended to be more santri in their orientation than were, for 
example, many kejaw&n priyayi. Pasisir priyayi often had apparently 
amicable working relationships and family ties with Muslim teachers, 
while some coastal political elites--notably those of Madura and Cire- 
bon--were frequently also religious leaders. In any case, any analysis 
of pasisir priyayi religion and culture must still remain based on 
assumptions, as the interaction between social structure, Islamization, 
Central Javanese influence and specific coastal characteristics re­
quires investigation.12
9. Among the most important wali were Sunan Ngampel-Denta (from Ngampel or Ampel in 
Surabaya), who was linked to the last king of Hindu-Javanese Majapahit, his sons 
Sunan Drajat (of Sedayu, though sometimes claimed by Tegal) and Sunan Bonang 
(Tuban), and his powerful son-in-law Sunan Giri (near Gresik), first of the 
"priest-kings" of Gresik who were termed "pope" by the Protestant Dutch. The 
other major wali were Sunan Gunung Jati of Cirebon, who brought Islam to Pria- 
ngan, Sunan Kudus, Sunan Kalinyamat (south Jepara) and Sunan Kali Jaga (Demak 
area). See Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, pp. 3-8, also H. Aboebakar, Sedjarah Mesdjid 
dan Alim Ibadah Dalamnja (Djakarta/Banjarmasin: Adil, 1955); Solichin Salam, 
Sedjarah Islam di Djawa (Djakarta: Djajamurnij, 1964); P. J. Veth, Java, geo- 
graphisch, ethnologisch, historisch (Haarlem: Bohn, 1896), I, pp. 229-40; Clif­
ford Geertz, Islam Observed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 25-29; 
H. J. de Graaf and Th. G. Th. Pigeaud, "De eerste Moslimse Vorstendommen op 
Java. Studien over de Staatkundige Geschiedenis van 15de en 16de Eeuw," Verhande- 
1ingen van het Koninklijks Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (VKI),
LXIX (1974).
10. Sutherland, "Notes on Java's Regent Families," Part I, pp. 132-38; Encyclopaedic 
van Nederlandsch-Indie (8 vols.; The Hague and Leiden: Nijhoff, 1917-46), en­
tries "Demak," "Giri."
]1. Van den Berg, Rangen en Titels, p. 32 note 1. On the period, see H. J. de Graaf, 
"De Regering van Sultan Agung, Vorst van Mataram, 1613-1645, en die van zijn 
Voorganger Panembahan Seda-ing-Krapjak, 1601-1613," VKI, XXIII (1958).
12. For interesting reflections on Islam and Javanese religion and culture, see for 
example Pigeaud, Literature of Java, I, pp. 6-7; Soebardi, "Santri Religious
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In Priangan, West Java, similar problems complicate attempts to 
define priyayi culture. Here also the local version of the priyayi, 
the menak, have an apparently amicable working relationship with Islam; 
many local ulama come from aristocratic governing circles. But here 
the question of Javanization is more pressing, as the cultural frontier 
between Sunda and the Javanese speaking lands to the east is much more 
defined than that between pasisir and kejawdn. How far the ethos of 
the menak differed from the Mataramese priyayi model is also an open 
question, but the particular nature of Priangan suggests that at least 
the concept of domination by a single court is inappropriate; in the 
absence of a continuing strong capital, the menak elite almost entirely 
derived from rather independent regional chiefs.
The "Priangan does have its own "Golden Age," that of the Indian- 
ized empire of Pajajaran. Founded in the twelfth century, Pajajaran 
remained the dominant center of Priangan until about 1526 when the last 
king, Siliwangi, was dethroned by victorious Muslim armies from Banten. 
Pajajaran is the focus for many Sundanese legends and traditions, and 
most of the local governing families trace their descent from Siliwangi 
or other Pajajaran kings. But it would be a mistake to assume that the 
Sundanese elite was focused on a single center; the authority of the 
old capital of Pajajaran, near Bogor, was probably largely symbolic, 
with the court not completely in control of mountainous and sparsely 
populated Priangan.* 13 * The basic political pattern seems to have been 
that of the later regencies, with networks of villages grouped together 
under ruling families, regional dynasties which continued to provide 
the highest native officials throughout the colonial period. These 
locally based bupati (regents) with their extended families, comprised 
the true elite of Priangan, so that although they were all closely re­
lated, and continually strengthened these ties by intermarriage, the 
dominant system was polycentric.
This decentralization was also evident in Sundanese culture. Re­
gencies were known for their own specialities and dialects, and the 
Citarum river formed a general dividing line. Cianjur was the main 
center west of the river, while Sumedang was dominant to the east; 
typically, both areas were known for their specific cultural achieve­
ments: Cianjur became well known for its own songs (Cianjuran), while
Sumedang wayang golek (puppetry) and music were highly regarded. Usu­
ally, it was the local aristocracy which provided the patronage to 
maintain and develop local cultural forms. In religion, too, the Pria­
ngan elites recognized a particular center; in this case, the Cirebon 
court provided the Islamic focus.
Even more striking examples of cultural diversity occur in ujung 
timur, the extreme east of Java. Here Madurese influence was very 
strong in the north coastal districts of Probolinggo, Kraksaan, Besuki, 
Panarukan and Bondowoso. The staunch adherence to Islam which was 
characteristic of the Madurese was not only brought by the waves of
Elements as Reflected in the Serat Tjentini," Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en 
Volkenkunde (BKI), CXXVII, No. 3 (1971), pp. 331-49; M. C. Ricklefs, "A Consid­
eration of Three Versions of the Babad Tanah Djawi, with Excerpts on the Fall 
of Madjapahit," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XXXV,
No. 2 (1972), pp. 285-315.
13. On Pajajaran see Veth, Java, I, pp. 214-19; on Priangan in general see F. de
Haan, Priangan de Preanger-regentschappen onder het Nederlandsch bestuur to 1811 
(4 vols.; Batavia: Kolft, 1910-12).
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immigrants who came to Java, but also by traveling teachers; many of 
the alim ulama were Madurese, and some were connected to the rulers of 
Madura. The court of Sumenep, in east Madura, was an important cul­
tural influence on the northeast Javanese, and some local bupati 
claimed descent from Sumenep rulers.
The situation further east and south was very different. Here 
Balinese influence was obvious in language, music and such popular cul­
tural forms as the barong, a type of "lion dance." This was the site 
of the last Javanese Sivaite kingdom of Balambangan; it had supposedly 
provided a temporary refuse for a son of Brawijaya, Adipati Gugur, who 
fled Central Java following the Muslim conquest of his father's Indian- 
ized state pf Majapahit. He founded the line of Balambangan kings who 
survived the ravages of Mataram's armies and early Dutch attacks until 
a series of expeditions in the 1760s and 1770s finally put an end to 
their rule.1*
Perhaps it would be possible to characterize the governing elites 
of the northern ujung timur as "santri priyayi" and those of the south­
east as "abangan priyayi," but this seems to be pushing the categories 
too far. For one thing, it is difficult to locate clearly defined 
elites in this area, much of which was only opened to intensive settle­
ment and development with the post-1870 plantation boom, and for an­
other the existence of very pronounced local idiosyncracies implies 
that any classification of social groups or cultural types should await 
field research rather than draw too heavily on Central Javanese models. 
Even the census takers in 1930 were forced to adopt regional categories 
when listing Banyuwangi's inhabitants: roughly one-third were described
as "Oesingers," with their own dialect and culture.15
Similarly, a high degree of local differentiation can be found in 
the other areas of Java: in Banten, between the north and the south;
in Cirebon between the core area of Cirebon itself and the more Sunda- 
nese influenced southern regencies; in kejawdn, between the mancanegara 
and the various inner rings, between eastern and western mancanegara, 
and within all these areas as well. Centuries of settlement and 
strongly rooted local societies set some areas apart from those recent­
ly opened up which drew their immigrant population from a number of 
different areas, as was the case in the area Geertz investigated.16 
Some villages or districts had been known for lawlessness or skilled 
craftsmanship, or as centers of ancient magic or modern Muslim learning 
for hundreds of years, while special historical circumstances also 
marked the perdikan desa (tax exempt villages) or the pavtiouliere 
landerijen (privately owned lands) as unique communities in their own 
right.17 Such marked variation in local society also impressed itself
14. See Veth, Java, I, pp. 252-57 on Balambangan.
15. Volkstelling 1930, III, Inheemsch Bevolking van Post Java (Batavia: Landscruk-
kerij, 1935).
16. Research for The Religion of Java was mostly carried out in "Modjokuto" (Pare) 
in east Central Java during the mid-nineteen fifties. Pare was opened up by 
migrants from Mataram, from the Brantas river valley, the Kediri plain and the 
pasisir north coast during the nineteenth century. Geertz, Religion, pp. 131- 
33.
17. Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indie, entries "Desa's (Vrije)," "Particuliere 
landerijen," and "Depok"; L. W. C. van den Berg, Het Inlandsche Gemeentewezen op 
Java en Madoera (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1901), pp. 135-40.
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upon the regional priyayi, either because they themselves originated 
from the area, or because, as officials sent in from outside or chiefs 
newly risen, they were forced to come to terms with the particular in­
terest groups and factions in the community they were expected to lead.
Neither Mataram's military adventures nor the coming of Islam had 
been able to replace cultural particularism with a more uniform and 
standardized civilization, although they undoubtedly did increase the 
common ground between regions. During the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries the gradual Pax Neerlandica and consolidation of Dutch admin­
istration created a climate within which exchange of ideas and mutual 
influence could be expected to increase. Ease of communication was 
also fostered by greater mobility following the elaboration of the road 
and rail network in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the 
growing tendency towards population concentrations resulting from demo­
graphic change, economic development and nascent urbanization. Twen­
tieth-century extensions of the education system and the rapid growth 
of mass media, particularly the press, must also have broken down the 
relative isolation of local elites. While these generalizations seem 
reasonably safe, there is very little data available on social and cul­
tural change within the Indonesian community, particularly as it re­
lates to provincial areas and either traditional or middle echelon 
leadership groups.
The extension of Dutch education to the Indonesian elite, coupled 
with the systematization of a more uniform civil service increased 
solidarity within the priyayi class and did much to create its image 
as a homogeneous group. But under the Dutch, as in earlier kingdoms, 
there was by no means a complete acceptance of the dominant center's 
culture, as was only to be expected given the alien nature of many 
European ideas and attitudes. New elements were combined with old, 
with no single pattern being followed, although in general it can be 
said that the generation of government-employed priyayi who entered 
the administrative training schools or who passed through the Dutch 
academic school system in the twentieth century were exposed to far 
more consistent and effective Westernizing influence than the priyayi 
of the preceding generation. Except for a handful of unusual men, 
these earlier officials were educated in traditional ways, or attended 
the vernacular elementary schools or, at most, the rudimentary chief's 
schools [hoofdensoholen).18
The relationships between peasant traditions, regional "courts" 
(for example, the dalem of the Priangan regents or the capitals of 
Banten and Cirebon), and expanding influences such as those of Mata­
ram's kejaw&n, Islam or European culture are extremely complex, and 
could probably be best approached by intensive research within speci­
fied limits. It is possible to identify centers of cultural life and 
to trace the dissemination of certain traits or forms, but it is very 
difficult to locate frontiers, as no clear, generally applicable boun­
daries existed. Cross-cutting patterns of regionalism, social and, 
probably, religious orientation could mean not only that what was true 
of Cirebon was not necessarily true of Banten, but also that generali­
zations about the Serang (North Banten) upper class were misleading 
either when applied to lower social strata in Serang itself, or to a 
comparable class in south Banten's Pandeglang.
18. Sutherland, "PangrSh Pradja," pp. 180-207, 414-27, and passim.
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"Priyayi culture," then, is hard to isolate, and certainly the 
Mataramese image would only be used with caution in many other areas 
of Java. While the priyayi were, as a class, in relatively close con­
tact with such influential "Great Traditions" (to borrow Redfield's 
term)19 as the Hindu-Javanese, Islamic and European, they still had 
cultural roots in the villages, even though they had risen above the 
peasant mass. It is probable that the priyayi's intermediary role 
shaped their cultural as well as their political development. Just as 
there was a compromise between center and regions in the balance of 
power, with the provincial elites hoping for enhanced prestige through 
their connection with the capital, so too cultural ties between local 
chiefs and sophisticated courts could be to their mutual benefit. The 
introduction and elaboration of new styles and art forms was convincing 
proof of the regional elites' closeness to the center, their mastery 
of complex and impressive techniques. But it could have been unwise 
for provincial chiefs to completely lose contact with the dialect and 
special art forms of their regions. A combination of local accent with 
cosmopolitanism may have proved the best middle path, showing sophisti­
cation without alienation, blending regional traditions with the pres­
tigious forms of the famous courts. The priyayi, as "brokers," would 
ideally have been at home in the cultural vocabulary of the two worlds 
they connected.
The Political Function of the Priyayi
Clifford Geertz has remarked that "the Javanese aristocracy had, 
until the Dutch came, but two ways to hold the peasants in order . . . 
simple military terror and religious enthusiasm."20 But this statement 
ignores the very real economic, social and political ties integrating 
Javanese society, and implies that the priyayi were simply instruments 
of the center, imposed upon the peasantry by a powerful court, with 
little local basis for their high position. While it is perhaps possi­
ble that this was true of the priyayi most closely integrated into the 
central administrative network, it is far from adequate as a descrip­
tion of the provincial priyayi. When such excessive stress is placed 
on priyayi links to the court, so minimizing their connections with the 
common people, then there is an inevitable tendency to exaggerate 
either the spiritual and ideological bases of their position, or their 
coercive and exploitative role.
The priyayi derived their status, power and authority from two 
distinct sources: their ties with the ruler, and their control of fun­
damental resources: agricultural produce, labor and potential soldiery.
These resources were produced by the land, not by urban technology or 
skills, and so the provincial priyayi with their rural bases were often 
in a very strong position. Both central and regional priyayi strength­
ened their ties with ruler or people in various ways; inter-marriage 
and elaboration of patron-client networks knit the heterogeneous hier­
archies of chiefs and officials into factions and interest groups 
within the priyayi class, and also linked them to nobility and common­
ers. Once established in high positions, men also found that attitudes 
towards office holders and possessors of the attributes of power (re­
galia, and so forth) gave them great authority even though they might
19. Robert Redfield, The Primitive World and Its Transformations (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1954); and Peasant Society and Culture (Chicago: Chi­
cago University Press, 1956).
20. Geertz, Religion, p. 231.
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have few obvious physical sanctions at their disposal. So even those 
without close ties to the court, who belonged to no high family, were 
nevertheless accepted as priyayi simply because they were powerful and 
had accommodated themselves to priyayi behavior patterns in both gov­
ernment and private life, and also because they used their ability to 
allocate patronage to create a strong clientele.
The problems inherent in applying European terminology to Javanese 
phenomena have contributed to the difficulty of distinguishing between 
various types of authorities and political relationships. The image of 
the priyayi as "officials" of the court is misleading; many would be 
better described as "chiefs" of particular regions or, in more powerful 
instances, as "lords" or even "princes," although in each case there 
are false connotations. Even on the most generalized level, it is 
apparent that the precursors of the modern priyayi were of several 
kinds.
Within the state of Mataram, for example, there was a clear dis­
tinction between the administrators of the three inner rings of the 
concentric model and those of the outer ring, the manoanegara. The 
inner rings, kraton, negara and negaragung were governed for and by 
court officials and nobles who lived in the capital, while the mancane- 
gara was ruled through a hierarchy of locally resident, territorially 
based officials under varying degrees of central control; both types of 
administrators would be described as priyayi. But while it is clear 
that officials of the inner circles derived their authority from their 
association with the center, those of the mancanegara could claim that 
their status was determined by their local position, and merely en­
hanced by their link to the ruler.21
Mataram's control of the mancanegara, of the vassal territories of 
the pasisir and the nominally subject lands to the west and east, was 
established by the military campaigns of its aggressive rulers. While 
the mancanegara was regarded as part of the realm proper, even here the 
courtfs ability to impose its will was limited. Central intervention 
into local affairs was minimal, providing only that products, labor and 
armed men were forthcoming in appropriate amounts at the proper times. 
As Mataram expanded from its heartland base in the plains, it absorbed 
petty kingdoms and virtually autonomous settlements. Where logistics 
and local circumstances permitted, these new acquisitions were inte­
grated into the court-supervised central zone; elsewhere, acknowledg­
ment of subordination to central hegemony was extracted from the local 
authorities. In the mancanegara areas of Banyumas, Madiun and Kediri, 
local chiefs from the old governing families formed the backbone of 
Later Mataram's administration, if it can be called that.22 In the 
outer regions of the pasisir, much of the old power structure remained.
The more powerful local chiefs were stubborn in their opposition 
to any Mataramese efforts to increase court control. They may have 
acknowledged its hegemony, but to the regional elites this did not 
imply a complete abdication of their own rights and powers. To them, 
the relationship between center and provinces was not one of command
21. Selosoemardjan, Social Changes in Jogjakarta (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press, 1962), pp. 23-35; Soemarsaid Moertono, State and Statecraft in Old Java:
A Study of the Later Mataram Period, 16th to 19th Century (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
Modern Indonesia Project, 1968).
22. Sutherland, "Notes on Java!s Regent Families," Part II, pp. 6-14.
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and obedience, but rather a fluctuating bargain subject to constant re­
view. The chiefs would place a proportion of their produce and man­
power at the court's disposal, they would be loyal military allies and 
abstain from cooperation with enemies of the center, but these obliga­
tions were finite. And they also had their price: the court was to
refrain from attacking the regions and provide them with some minimal 
aura of protection; the connection between ruler and chiefs was intend­
ed to enhance the prestige and hence the power of each in their own 
context. The ruler could point proudly to his many vassals, the chiefs 
could boast of their links to the court. But by no means were the re­
gional elites going to renounce their independence in their local set­
ting unless by force. They were prepared to give a proportion of their 
wealth and limited obedience, but they would resist attempts to uproot 
them, to destroy their local power bases.
Tension between central and regional elites was inevitable if the 
ruler was at all anxious to enlarge his state, which meant subjugating 
ever widening circles of local chiefs, or if he wished to centralize 
government, which entailed the progressive reduction of the regional 
leaders' independence. If it was at all possible, the dominant ruler 
would attempt to replace provincial dynasties with his own appointees, 
men dependent upon him for their advancement. But such a move could 
lead to rebellion or at least result in local obstructionism, so many 
kings were forced to leave the chiefs in power and tried to control 
them with traditional and somewhat crude techniques. The use of spies 
was common, assassination was resorted to when necessary; a judicious 
planning of marriage alliances combined with the allocation of patron­
age provided more positive incentives. When the powerful coastal lords 
who had already acknowledged Mataram's hegemony resisted further en­
croachments upon their freedom, the ambitious rulers, Sultan Agung 
(1613-1645) and Amangkurat (Tegal Wangi, 1646-1677), took harsh steps, 
putting the princely families of Pati, Madura, Surabaya, Semarang and 
Jepara to the sword.23 24 But such efforts to alter permanently the bal­
ance of power in favor of the center were doomed to failure as long as 
communications were difficult and the regional chiefs retained their 
control of local resources.
Once the regional elites had formally acknowledged the ruler as 
suzerain then they could, from one point of view, be regarded as "offi­
cials" of the king. This was, naturally, the interpretation favored in 
court circles. But it would be a mistake to accept the court's version 
of relationships too literally, especially as the available accounts 
often formed part of the ruler's effort to legitimize his position. 
Mataramese literature on government forms the main basis for Soemarsaid 
Moertono's valuable study of the Javanese state. He concludes that in 
Mataram "the whole apparatus of administration was inevitably an exten­
sion of the king's rule," and that "whatever power his administrators 
might have was derived from above."21* This was undoubtedly true of the 
theoretical basis of the court official's position, but it does not 
really apply to the region-based chiefs and, even so far as the offi­
cials were concerned, it does not take into account the politicking and
23. Veth, Java, II, pp. 14-15; B. J. 0. Schrieke, "Ruler and Realm in Early Java" in 
his Indonesian Sociological Studies (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1957), II, p. 218, 
and passim; de Graaf, "Sultan Agung"; H. J. de Graaf, "De Regering van Sunan 
Mangku-Rat I, Tegal Wangi, Vorst van Mataram, 1646-1677," VKI, XXXIII (1961), 
XXIX (1962).
24. Moertono, State and Statecraft, p. 5.
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competition which centered on the struggle to attain a certain rela­
tionship with the king.25
The literature of the courts emphasized the unique, utterly cen­
tral position of the ruler and the unity of the realm. But it could be 
argued that this vision of all faces turned towards the radiant king 
was an ideal rather than a reality, and the stress cannot hide--may 
even indicate--the persisting importance of local differentiation and 
the essentially conglomerate nature of political organization. Simi­
larly, it is possible that the very image of the priyayi, steeped in 
the king-focused ethos of the court, was encouraged by the centers as 
a technique to counter the social and cultural idiosyncracies which 
encouraged political polycentrism. Unfortunately, little has been 
written "on the ethos and organization of courts other than Mataram, so 
one cannot say how true that image holds for the other major kingdoms, 
such as the sultanates of Banten or Cirebon, while there is a lament­
able lack of research on the social and political history of petty 
princedoms or provincial units. Until this gap is filled, it is likely 
that generalizations will continue to be based on our knowledge of 
Mataram, but at least the limitations of this perspective should be 
acknowledged.
The pre-colonial ancestors of the priyayi covered the spectrum 
from court officials, dependent upon the ruler's whims, to almost inde­
pendent local chiefs, rulers of powerful vassal states or the rural 
headmen of village complexes. These men were intermediaries, linking 
a very diverse rural society with the complex world of the courts. 
Depending on their position in the connecting hierarchy, their relative 
distance from the center, the officials and chiefs were subject to 
varying degrees of pressure from both their local context and the cen­
tral administration. Their vulnerability and need to accommodate to 
such pressures was determined by the extent to which they controlled 
their own sources of authority and power.
The gradual establishment of Dutch control did not alter this 
situation in any fundamental way; alien rule did not result in a dis­
placement of the provincial priyayi elite, although it sharply cur­
tailed the scope of Mataram's court and abolished those of Banten and 
Cirebon. The VOC found it cheap and convenient to work through the 
native chiefs both in its early collections of produce and in its ulti­
mate assumption of political power. The Company had no interest in 
recasting the ramshackle hierarchies of local chiefs and officials into 
a regular administration: instead, they merely backed chosen men who
would meet their economic and political demands. This tended to con­
firm or even increase the independence of many headmen, since so long 
as they performed to VOC satisfaction they could use the Dutch as a 
source of support in their local power plays. Since the Europeans were 
neither interest in nor well informed concerning indigenous administra­
tive rights and duties, their ignorant support enabled some of their 
regents to transgress the checks and norms of the native system.
In areas in which vital VOC interests were involved, the freedom 
of the regents was very circumscribed. But the Company had a narrow, 
span of interest: it insisted only that the bupati acknowledge Dutch
suzerainty, abstain from political or trade relations with foreign
25. Ibid., pp. 101-18, does discuss the regional chiefs, but in no great detail.
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powers, keep the peace and collect and deliver required produce. But 
where local affairs were involved, in matters of custom or low level 
politicking the native chiefs were left to govern more or less as they 
liked. In some cases their power to punish and to allocate patronage 
may even have been expanded by their contact with the Dutch and 
their economy. Dutch control was arbitrary, personal and crude, super­
vision of local chiefs was loose and erratically maintained, so that 
the regencies were largely autonomous and self-regulating in noncommer­
cial matters.
It was only after the abolition of the VOC that a more interven­
tionist mood was displayed by JavaTs European governors: H. W. Daendels
(1808-11) and the British T. S. Raffles (1811-16) tried to make the 
chiefs into "officials dependent upon the European center and to estab­
lish more direct contact between the central administration in Batavia 
and native agents below the regent level, the village and district 
leaders who later emerged as lower echelon native officials.26 But it 
was only in the middle of the century, when the Dutch parliamentarians 
were struggling to frame a constitution (Regeerings Reglement) for 
their East Indian colonies that some fundamental problems in the nature 
of Javanese administration were publicly examined.
The dilemma faced by the States General was now to phrase that 
section of the constitution which related to the native chiefs in colo­
nial service. Here they came up against difficulty in reconciling cen­
tral delegation of power with the existence of authority deriving from 
local social and political institutions. While this had some similari­
ties with the earlier existence of different sources of power--court 
and local status--it was complicated further by the fact that the new 
central ruler was foreign, alien to indigenous ideas and structures.
The position of the pangrSh praja, the native administrative ser­
vice, was set out in two major articles of the colonial constitution, 
articles sixty-seven and sixty-nine. Article sixty-seven stated that:
Insofar as circumstances permit, the native population are to be left 
under the immediate supervision of their own, government-appointed 
and supervised, chiefs, subject to such higher supervision as shall 
be fixed by general or particular orders of the governor general.
This article was heavily criticized in the States General, and 
equally strongly and successfully defended by its champions. Each 
point of view reflected a familiar approach to colonial affairs. The 
attack was led by J. R. Thorbecke, leader of the Liberals, and W. R. 
van Hoevell, an experienced and longstanding critic of the governments 
handling of colonial affairs. J. C. Baud and Minister C. F. Pahud 
(1849-56) defended their phrasing, denying that their opponents’ criti­
cisms were either relevant or useful.
Thorbecke decried the term eigen hoof den, meaning ’’own” or ’’natur­
al” chiefs, and complained of its ambiguity. He asked that a clear 
distinction be made between hoofden (chiefs) and ambtenaven (officials), 
the criterion being the sources from which they gained their right to
26. For general accounts see Clive Day, The Policy and Administration of the Dutch 
in Java (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1966); B. J. 0. Schrieke, ”The 
Native Rulers” in his Indonesian Sociological Studies, I, pp. 169-221.
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govern. "Natural chiefs," he said, "whether they be princes or village 
heads, are those who derive their authority from native institutions; 
the other officials, irrespective of whether they are native or Euro­
pean, derive their authority from the Netherlands government."
Thorbecke was opposed by the spokesmen for pragmatism who believed 
that as long as the system worked it was better not to create unneces­
sary complications and doubts by speculative thinking, theorizing and 
meddling in native society. Minister Pahud made two simple, flat 
statements in reply to Thorbecke: natural chiefs were those of the
same race as the people, and, since all officials were appointed or 
confirmed in office by the Dutch, there was no point in distinguishing 
between sources of authority.27
Both these viewpoints had a certain amount of truth and reason on 
their side. Thorbecke was being realistic in that he acknowledged the 
extent of the European role in Javanese political life. His approach 
also offered the advantages of flexibility in that it made no fundamen­
tal distinction on the basis of race alone between native and European 
officials. This would have meant that shifts in indigenous society, 
such as the social and occupational mobility resulting from the spread 
of Western education, could have been easily absorbed by the government 
structure, so providing for a relatively easy modernization of the 
native role in administration. But he was naive in thinking that the 
role of "chief" and "official" were easily distinguishable. On the 
contrary, they were closely interwoven and mutually reinforcing, the 
dividing line being as elusive and fluctuating as the old frontier 
between centrally-appointed and locally-based chiefs. Moreover, any 
attempt to translate such complex distinctions as those made by Thor­
becke into administration regulations would have been doomed to failure.
As far as Pahud and Baud were concerned such analysis was futile 
and unnecessary. Their attitude was that as long as the basic princi­
ple was established that the Netherlanders held ultimate power, then it 
was best to keep things simple and vague enough so that, within broad 
guidelines, individual European officials had enough leeway to cope 
with local circumstances and developments. But they were wrong if they 
thought the actual situation was as simple as their formula, for they 
were ignoring the existence of a built-in contradiction in the colonial 
government structure.
This contradiction arose out of the simultaneous profession of two 
fundamentally incompatible principles. The Dutch were determined to 
keep all meaningful decision making in European hands; at the regional 
level, this meant that the native officials were utterly subservient to 
the European civil service, the BB (Binnenlands Bestuur, Interior Ad­
ministration). Yet at the same time a basic principle of the Nether­
lands colonial state was that of ruling through the native chiefs, 
retaining the forms of traditional government and guarding the prestige 
of the old elite. Although most of Java had come under direct Dutch 
rule (with the exception of the four truncated principalities of Cen­
tral Java), the native civil service was seen as being a direct contin­
uation of the aristocratic governing stratum of the old states. The 
effort to reconcile a European monopoly of official decision-making
27. W. F. Winkler, "Zijn de regenten op Java volkshoofden?" Koloniale Studien, XII, 
No. 4 (1927), pp. 153-73; G. W. Mossel, "Abmtenaar of volkshoofd?" Koloniale 
Studien, XIII, No. 2 (1929), pp. 181-215.
72
with protecting the social status of the displaced class placed a con­
siderable strain on regional officials, both Dutch and native, and 
placed the pangrSh praja in an increasingly invidious position.
The colonial government had to deny native institutions any right 
to confer official authority, reserving for itself the prerogative of 
formal legitimation, for it simply did not trust the Javanese. Yet at 
the same time the usefulness of the pangrSh praja--the very foundation 
of the administration--lay in the control it exercised over the people 
by virtue of its prestige, and because of the informal legitimation of 
its authority by indigenous traditions. This prestige was felt to be 
created, or at least enhanced (opinions differed) by the identification 
of the native corps with local traditions and institutions. This iden­
tification -was basic to the colonial conception of the native officials 
as volkshoofden (popular chiefs), and there was a continuing debate 
until the end of the colonial regime in 1942 over the relative impor­
tance of the two major elements determining the native officials 
status and function, that of the volkshoofd and that of the ambtenaar 
(the official).
As European economic involvement advanced and the elaboration of 
the corporate plantation system brought more capital and more white 
settlers to Java, there was an obviously increasing need for a more 
systematic and efficient administration. This meant more literate and 
skilled native officials; specifically, it meant some provision of 
Western schooling. But many Dutchmen feared that a European style edu­
cation would alienate the officials from their society, and so destroy 
their useful influence over the people. The need for a more effective 
officialdom was finally reconciled with the f,protect-the-traditional- 
chiefsn policy by a de facto specialization of function within the 
native corps. The maintenance of symbolic authority and the exertion 
of charismatic leadership increasingly became the function of the high­
est officials, the regents, while the regentfs assistant, the patih, 
and the district chiefs (wedana) handled the actual routine of govern­
ment under BB direction. In this way the Dutch hoped to get the best 
of both worlds, to keep selected elements of the past alive to serve 
the needs of present and future. The bupati, with their volkshoofd 
hold over the people, would harness them to the colonial plough to till 
the soil for the benefit of the Netherlands. Meanwhile, the lower 
officials would keep the roads and irrigation streams clear, and the 
files up to date.
To a considerable extent this specialization was a natural devel­
opment from the early nineteenth century trend towards direct communi­
cation between Europeans and subordinate native officials, but it was 
also linked to traditional Javanese attitudes to government. Tradi­
tionally, the political and social styles of the lower chiefs were 
modeled upon those of their superiors; there were distinctions of 
degree between the various levels of chiefs, but no real differences 
of kind. But at the highest level, that of the sultan or sunan, there 
was a certain specialization as the rulers were felt to be too elevated 
to engage directly in the routine of government, which was controlled 
by their chief minister or patih. But the patih could never take over 
the spiritual and religious functions of the paramount ruler. There 
were parallels in this with the colonial situation, with its growing 
identification of the regents with the volkshoofd aspect and the other 
native officials becoming more and more ambtenaren.
This trend was made explicit in the second major article relating 
to native officials in the 1854 constitution. Article sixty-nine
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stated that "Regents were chosen by the Governor General from among the 
native population" but that a son or close relative of the last bupati 
would be chosen as his successor insofar as this was reconcilable with 
the (very vague) preconditions of "ability, diligence, honesty and 
loyalty." Inheritance of office for regents was made a legally recog­
nized right; it was no longer a favor granted by the central govern­
ment, whose positive freedom to confer office had become the negative 
freedom of refusing to do so. An important shift in emphasis had oc­
curred, and a barrier to change was erected which helped the regents 
defend their entrenched status when it came under heavy criticism in 
the twentieth century.
The implications of these developments were profound. There was 
not only a disjunction between the holders of ultimate power (the 
Dutch) and those who continued to hold the symbols of authority (the 
native officials), but there was also a distinction within the pangrdh 
praja between those most intimately associated with the traditional 
and culturally defined aspects of government, the bupati, and the 
lesser officials entrusted with the mundane technicalities of adminis­
tration. The regents, prime symbols of indigenous political traditions 
at the local level, were often isolated from all involvement in admin­
istration, while being closely associated with the colonial overlords. 
This tended to discredit the priyayi ethic in the eyes of the intelli­
gentsia and nationalist leadership which emerged during the early twen­
tieth century; to many of these critics, the regents were men who sold 
their influence to foreigners in exchange for a shallow pretense of 
authority and the material perquisites of office. Also, many lesser 
officials, increasingly well-educated and influenced by Western social 
and political thought, resented their less capable but well-born col­
leagues1 monopoly of the administrative hierarchy’s apex.
The development of the nationalist movement placed the government 
priyayi in a difficult position. Although many of the new spokesmen, 
who denied that the colonial native officials represented the people, 
were themselves of priyayi descent, they based their own claims to 
popular leadership not on birth or government service, but on ideas of 
democracy and national independence. Often the sons of civil servants, 
they nevertheless condemned the foundations of the old priyayi status 
and ethic as both feudal and colonial, claiming that high birth, insis­
tence on maintaining tradition, and employment by exploitative aliens 
conferred no right to lead, but on the contrary, exposed the moral and 
political bankruptcy of the established elite.
By the end of the colonial period the priyayi were more closely 
identified with the center than they had ever been; bureaucratization 
of the pangr^h praja, although partial, had created a single corps, 
replacing the loosely knit network of chiefs and officials, although 
many of the old attitudes and relationships remained. The interven­
tionist policy of the Dutch government intensified priyayi interference 
in village life, and strengthened the view that they were mere "tools 
of colonialism." At the same time, emphasis on up-grading the corps’ 
efficiency resulted in increasing Westernization and, although this 
process also was very far from complete, there were signs of real 
alienation between native officials and the people they were meant to 
lead. Dutch suspicion of Islam made it very difficult for the priyayi 
to achieve a working relationship with new Islamic movements, and any 
cooperation with political critics of the regime was also ruled out by 
colonial attitudes.28
28. Sutherland, "Pangreh Pradja," pp. 512-26.
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The net effect of these developments was to set the priyayi apart 
as a special caste with a narrowly defined political function, that of 
serving the center. Hence the image of the priyayi as dependent agents 
of an exploitative government is truer of the late colonial period than 
of traditional polities, VOC times or the earlier nineteenth century. 
For centralization of government, improvements in communications and 
unquestionable Dutch control had eroded the local bases of priyayi 
power, leaving them no effective countervailing strength with which to 
face Batavia. So whereas the provincial priyayi had once been involved 
in a fluctuating contest with centralizing states, by the early twen­
tieth century not much more was left of the original relationship than 
the theories of duty and obedience and a pallid continuation of the 
mediating priyayi role. Once the priyayi were actively involved in 
managing the interaction between people and centers, but in the fully 
developed colonial system they were subordinate, reduced to using the 
placatory and manipulative techniques of the weak facing the strong.
Nevertheless, the native officials were still a variegated group. 
Although the increasing influence of Western attitudes and behavior was 
reducing the cultural heterogeneity of the corps, it tended to sharpen 
the distinction between generations. Basic differences between regions 
remained, and attempts to impose complete bureaucratization and stan­
dardization were thwarted both by the colonial dogma itself and by the 
persisting geopolitical and cultural factors which had complicated the 
centralizing efforts of the indigenous states. Incompatibility of 
traditional attitudes to government and the continuing strength of 
intracorps personal ties also hindered the introduction of various 
rationalizing innovations. The convoluted interaction of indigenous 
reality, Dutch interpretations, colonial policy and social evolution, 
and their effects upon the priyayi, are well illustrated by the chang­
ing correlation between "priyayi11 and "aristocracy.” The Netherlands 
authorities tended to set great store upon the idea of the priyayi as 
a hereditary governing elite, but they did not always appreciate the 
pragmatic subtleties of Javanese ideas.
The Priyayi as Social’ Class
There seems to have been a strong tendency to hereditary appoint­
ment to office in Java. Sons usually succeeded fathers, or at least a 
man could expect to be followed in his position by a nephew, son-in-law 
or some reasonably close relative. This was an established practice, 
but not an inviolable rule. Inheritance of function or status was not 
inevitable in the way, for example, that titles automatically pass down 
among the English aristocracy. Instead the rule was that a son or 
close relative would succeed providing that there were no sound reasons 
for appointing an outsider. If the family had so abused their office 
that they were hated, and hence ineffective, or if the court was con­
vinced that they were bent on treachery, then an outsider could be 
appointed. It was always easier to replace men serving near the court 
than the provincial officials or local chiefs.
In Java, as in other Southeast Asian societies, there was a theo­
retical decrease in the degree of nobility as distance from the royal 
ancestor increased. Blue blood thinned with each generation. For a 
man to retain his aristocratic status birth had to be reinforced by 
office, and preferably by serving close to the ruler or the dominant 
family of the region, as politics remained highly personal. Rank also 
strengthened the aristocratic element in the most humble lineages, as
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a man of position was sought after in marriage by well-placed families, 
and he could always employ the right experts to trace back his geneal­
ogy to suitably elevated ancestors. If village parentage stretched 
back several generations, there remained the possibility that a wander­
ing scholar or fleeing prince might be located in the vicinity at a 
convenient time, or else a fairly close forebear could be shrouded in 
mystery, refusing to reveal his birth but suspected of being a man of 
the highest origins, and, in more distant generations, of great magical 
power. Since' people usually reasoned that a man who attained high rank 
must be of good birth, little conscious deception or hypocrisy was in­
volved.
So it was not axiomatic that position followed birth: birth could
also follow position. Even when family succession was preserved, a son 
did not step into his father's shoes at once; some apprenticeship was 
usual, and he did not always receive the same titles and appanage lands 
as his father. Lands and titles were granted in recognition of changes 
in social position (for example, marriage, attaining a significant age, 
and so forth) or were conferred directly by the ruler as rewards for 
services rendered. Within both court and regional elites there was no 
firm principle of primogeniture: recruitment was usually of the more
able members of the extended family. Since surnames were not used in 
Java and individuals could have several names during their lifetime, 
hereditary appointments or social status were not always obvious to 
outsiders. New names were chosen to reflect position as were titles: 
harmony was essential. Nevertheless, local people and those involved 
in administrative or aristocratic circles would always know each 
others' background, as it played such an important part in Javanese 
life.
Social mobility into the governing elites was allowed for within 
the indigenous system. Military prowess, loyalty, administrative abil­
ity or sheer good luck in being in the right place at the right time 
enabled common men to rise in the service of kings and chiefs alike.
As they ascended the ladder, they acquired the coloring of their en­
vironment. They assumed the names, discovered the family trees and 
adopted the life-style which accorded with their rank. Their children 
received the usual training of their new class, being sent to live with 
noble families to learn the social and professional skills necessary to 
further their own careers, so confirming the family's rise from the 
kampung (village) to priyayi status. A careful selection of marriage 
partners enabled new families both to consolidate their political posi­
tion and to ensure that their descendants could share in illustrious 
ancestry, embracing the kings of Majapahit, of Pajajaran or the Prophet 
Muhammad himself. No doubt too, in the manner of homines novi every­
where, the new priyayi punctiliously observed the cultural forms of 
the established elite. And, as the village provided able talent and 
fresh blood for the local aristocracies, so the provinces also sent 
their more capable and ambitious sons to the central courts.29
But the Dutch clung to their belief that the priyayi were a simple 
hereditary aristocracy, and that much of the authority which made them 
so useful to the regime derived from their high birth. So the colonial 
authorities tried to buttress this aristocratic caste by introducing 
the hereditary principle for regents, and they tried also to ensure
29. For example, Moertono, State and Statecraft, p. 95; Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Struk- 
tur sosial dari masjarakat tradisionil dan kolonial," Lembaran Sedjarah, No. 4 
(1969), pp. 11-34. “
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that native officials were recruited from suitably elevated strata. 
Preference was always given to the well born in such matters as en­
trance into schools, selection for the civil service and promotion 
within it. Despite these efforts, the twentieth-century native offi­
cials were increasingly drawn from the lesser priyayi and commoners, 
partly because the well born were finding more rewarding and less re­
stricted careers elsewhere, and partly because the need for efficient 
native officials provided the humbly born with a ready-made path for 
upward mobility.30
Democratization within the pangrdh praja varied sharply from re­
gion to region. The bupati families in Priangan, for example, were 
apparently reinforced in their elite position by Dutch policy, and 
their relatives dominated the upper levels of the civil service. Many 
old pasisir families, on the other hand, seem to have been shattered by 
the combined attentions of Mataram and the VOC, so the region shows 
less elite continuity. An even more obvious case of a rather non- 
aristocratic pangrdh praja is the extreme east, the ujung timur, where 
the officials tended to be colonial administrators, shorn of the more 
elaborate manifestations of the priyayi mystique which still character­
ized the government priyayi of, for example, Priangan or the old manca- 
negara region.31
If, then, our image of Java's priyayi is to be at all realistic, 
we must give due recognition to their linking role connecting the com­
mon people with the courts. As both officials and regional chiefs, the 
priyayi were subject to pressure and influence from their local environ 
ments as well as from the capitals. Consequently, no single model can 
do justice to the many permutations of priyayi culture, nor to the 
variations in their political status and functions. A man earned the 
label priyayi not simply by his ties to the court, nor by birth or 
rank, nor by merely displaying correct cultural characteristics and 
life-style. No single factor conferred priyayi status, but rather a 
cluster of attributes, which included some or all of the above.
Any definite judgment as to the relative significance of the vari­
ous sources of priyayi status should be limited to a particular place 
and time, as the fluctuations in the political position of regional 
elites, together with cultural evolution and variation combined to pro­
duce a highly differentiated upper class. There are many unanswered 
questions about priyayi development, including assessments of signifi­
cance and range of Javanization, Islamization and Western influence, 
of the relevance and usefulness of class-oriented examinations of tra­
ditional society, of the role of rural middle level elites, and of the 
history and functioning of communities beyond the major capitals.
As Clifford Geertz himself has cogently argued, attempts must be 
made "to trace out the sociological links between cultural themes and 
political developments,"32 and it would seem that in the case of the 
priyayi we need to know more about the role of both court officials 
and, particularly, regional chiefs before we can generalize about the
30. Sutherland, "PangrSh Pradja," pp. 414-27.
31. Ibid., p. 476 note 89; Sutherland, "Notes on Java's Regent Families," passim.
32. Clifford Geertz, "Afterword: The Politics of Meaning" in Claire Holt, Culture 
and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 322
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bases of their power and their value systems. Moreover, it seems obvi­
ous that events during the colonial period were crucial in shaping 
priyayi development, and an awareness of this is essential if we are to 
avoid unwarranted assumptions of either change or continuity, based on 
a simple comparison of a Mataramese version of "the indigenous state" 
with post-colonial Indonesia. We must ask not only what Dutch rule 
meant in terms of Westernization, but how far the infrastructure it 
created affected the internal dynamics of native society. It would be 
very interesting to know how far the colonial situation facilitated the 
emergence of the Yogyakarta-Surakarta center as the dominant cultural 
model, or whether Dutch policies sharpened competition and antagonisms 
between Islamic and syncretist groups. The extension of modern large- 
scale economic activity, improved means of communication and security 
enforcement, intensified administrative interference and the spread 
of Westernized attitudes must also have altered relationships between 
groups in rural areas.
The location of various socio-cultural nuclei is essential in 
Java's ancient and diverse society, where such distinctions both define 
and reinforce other identifications, such as those of social classes, 
economic groups or ideological persuasions. Nonetheless, no single set 
of categories or ideal types should be allowed to obscure the existence 
or importance of other orientations and frameworks. Among the fascina­
tions of Javanese politics and history are the permutations wrought by 
the overlapping and cross-cutting of various loyalties, frames of 
reference and cultural identities. It would be unfortunate if this 
richness should be reduced by a premature acceptance of oversimplified 
models, no matter how illuminating and appealing they may be.
